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PREFACE
This thesis represents research in the general field of
emergent evolution.

The works of Lloyd Morgan and

s.

Alexander

were studied in particular and the works of others in allied
fields were used in a supplementary oapaoity.

It maintains

that Morgan offers a unique personal interpretation
universe.

Its purpose is to

~1ve

an

understandin~

or
of

the
Mor~an'e

scheme and to call attention to certain problems within the
limits of his theory.
In the process of the development of this thesis, the
following libraries were used: The Library of

Con~rees,

Washington, D.C., The Virginia State Library, The Richmond
Public Library, and The University of Richmond Library.

I

wish to aoknowledge here the courtesies extended by the staffs
of these libraries.
I wish to give recognition to my fellow-student, George
Crabtree, who read the manuscript and gave valuable or1t1c1sms.
It is with a sense of sincere appreciation that I oonsider
the main advisor to this thesis.

The imperfections entailed

are in no instances due to his counsel end the positive oontr1but1on that it makes
ence of Dr. B.

Richmond, Va.
May, 1947

c.

~ay

be traced to the teaching and influ-

Holtzclaw.

TO 'MY WIFE

INTRODUCTION
The problem of metaphysics is one of the most baffling,

yet one of the most interesting in the field of philosophy.
From the time of Anaximander, many different views of evolution have been offered as a solution to th1s problem. ·The
one that we shall discuss is a comparatively modern one and
is expounded by Conwy Lloyd ?Jorgan.

Twelve books by

l~organ

haver!S'ubl!shed and most of these d~al with the hypothesis
of emergent evolution.

His greatest work was the book entitled

"Emergent Evolution" whioh embodies a comprehensive preeen•
.

tation

or

the hypothesis

greatest part of my

fro~

disouss~on

ples set forth in this work.

beg1nning to end.

'

Thus, the

will be concerning the princiIt ts my purpose in this thesis

to offer certain problems that confront Lloyd Morgan's soheme.
As a

prelim:lnary, I believe it is prof! table· to discuss the

two greatest 1nfluenoes upon Morgan to enable us to
a better understanding of h.is system.
ences are Professor

s.

r~oeive

The outstandlng influ-

Alexander and the field of biology.

Some of I!organ• s most essential views are taken from Alexander,

but there is a parting between the two men upon other points.
Chapter five will

be devoted to these diff'orenoes.

tation and explanation of Morgante

emer~ent

The presen-

evolution ie the

topic for Chapters two, three and four and the problems enta1led
are presented in

Chapter s1.x.

Then, my conclusions are offered

INTRODUCTION (CONT'D)
in the final chapter.

It is difficult to say just what

another person means in new

langua~e

symbols.

son; I will frequently resort to quotations.
I wish to give a complete synopsis of

emer~ent

For this reaIn this thesis,
evolution as

it is propounded by Morgan and present various problems that
arise concerning it.

CHAPTER I
INFLUIDTCES ON MORGAN

A,,,

Biology

Conwy Lloyd Morgan, an English philosopher and scientist,
began his works with the publication of "Animal Life and
Intelligence" in 1890.

In this volume, ho dealt with organisms

and their development.

He was very much impressed by the close

linkage of the structures of tho nifferent animals.

He was

also convinced that life was scmiething that was progressing
and.capable of all sorts of

it was yesterday,

~or

ohen~es.

"Life today is not what

·1

will 1t be tomorrow the same as today" •

.

By observing and studying various animals, he concluded that
the organism was fitted to respond to certain influences of
the external world and that these influences could in turn
cause particular developments in the organism.

By an elaborate

set-up of experiments, be disoovered that animals possessed

1.

pg. 182 Animal Life and Intelligenoe by c. L. Morgan
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intelligence, but he would not ascribe reason or rational
powers to them.

This study was basia to his later belief

in mental evolution.

He inferred that the lower stages or

mental development were connected with the perceptual sphere
(eye) and the higher stages were conneoi:ed
Y;ith the conceptual
,

sphere (brain).· Hie next tv10 worlrn, "Introduction to Compara-

tive Psychology" end

11

Psychology for Teachers" were both writ-

ten 1n 1895 snd deal with aortain themea ot practice for
teachers and basic psychological concepts.

However, they had

little significance in his emergent evolution hypothesis which
arose later on.

In 1896, "Habit and Instinct" was published.

This oonoluslon was reaahed."thot wh:toh is outs:tde experience
oan afford no data for the oonsoious guidanoe of future behavior,"

1

Re found that experience was a pre-requ1site for

planning and there exlstod a.oloee alliance between emotion
and instinct.

Consciousness was aeen as the awareness that

characterized the lov1er level of extstence as well as the
higher.

"Animal Behavior" (1900),. "The Interpretation of'

·Mature" (1905), and "Instinct and Experience (1912) were
works that brought forth further research in the b1olog1oal
field and thereby offered more hints to emergent evolution.
By the time his 1905 publ1oat!on y;as made, !!.organ had in mind

emergence as an interpretation of all reality but the aotual

1,

pg. 131 Habit and Instinct by c. L. Morgan
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expounding of the complete hypothesis was made in the University of st. Andrews in 1922.
owed in 1923.

"Emergent Evolution" foll-

This partiouler book provines the source for

the groater part of this theais for lt ls he:rc that the view
of emergent evolution culminates and is advanced 1n entirety.
However, Morgan's later publioat1.ons were intended to shed
further light upon the subject.

"Mind At The Crossways"

{1929) and "The An1T!1al Mind" (1930) ere further attempts. to

elaborate the emergence of mind within the general scheme of
emergent evolution.

They go 1.nto detail but add only a small

amount to the original assumpt1ons.

Hie final work, "The

Emergence of lJovelty" (1033) is a restatement of what is in-

cluded in h1a main volume.

It attempts to clarify the diff·

erent kinds of evolution an<l tnsiet upon the emergence of a
new kind of reln tedness alrendy discussed in "Emergent Evolu•

tion".

Tho moat 1Mportnnt book, other than the main voluoeJt

is nL1fe 1 Mind and Spirit" (1926) in which the role of Spirit
is discussed in relation to life and mind as emergents.
Because ·Of profound scholarship and genuine interest in
the biological fiela,
a solution to the
mechanism.

T~organ

hiator~cal

was competent enough to attempt
controversy between v1tal1sm and

A nynopets of thts problem will be given here be-

oauae biology was one of the

entire phrlosophy.

In the

~reatent

foundations for Morgan's

n~c-old atte~pt

to explain adequately

those things that exist before us involving life, two well-

4

formulated theories are advooated'.

These are meohanism and

vitalism.

Mechanism, sa 1 ts name ind1oa tes, is the explanation ·
that interprets organisms as mere machines.

Organisms act

and function 1n their respeotive ways because they are so

constructed as to produce the result that is obtained.
"Living organisms may 'be regarded as conao1ous or unconscious
physical and chemical mechanisms."

l

Researohes in th1.s field

have established certain facts t..het support the theory.
of these is the faot that the matter of
composed is reducible to the

found outside the body.

wh~oh or~anisms

sa~e ohe~ioal

One

are

elements as are

No new matter 1s formed in the body,

or disappears from it.

Another argument offered 1s that the

whole of the energy which is liberated in the body, whether
as heat, mechanical work, or in other forms, oan be traced to

sources outside the body.

great physical laws

or

Then, we can conclude that the two

conservation of matter and oonservat1on

of energy can thus be extended to all living organisms, even
human beings.

In answer to the objeot1on based on the ex!st-

enoe of oonsoiousnese, meohanists say·:tt makes no difference
to the energy balance
oious or not.

1.

of

the body whether an animal is oons-

so, consciousness

!s treated as an

aooompan1~ent.

p. l Mechanism, Life and Personality by J. s. Haldane
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It is an aooompaniment of physical and meohan1oal action,
but not something that alters in any way the physical
chemical changes which it scoompanies.

an~

This additional set

of ootis1derst1.ons 1a offered by the mechanist.

"In all

biological investigations we are investigating either structure or activity, and when we eome to details -we find that

the structure is physical and ohem1oal structure and the
activity phya1oal and chemical aot!vity.

Hence, biology

oan be nothing but the physloe end chemistry of
Fur~her

1

organ~ems."

support 1s argued from the history of biology.

.

In

the fiold 1or physiology, Dorel11 applied the principles of
meohanios to elucidate the action of the muscles on the limbs.
Kepler applied tho principles of optics to the action of the
eye, in vision.

Harvey made advances relating to the problem

or the circulation of the blood by physical observation and
interpretation of the facts in meohen1oa1 terms.

These faots

are used to support the pril!'iary idea that orp;an1sms e.re phys1ooohem1cal oCYMpounds and that all behavior may be analyzed 1n
terms of the laws

or

physics and chemistry.

The wonderful

complexity, accuracy and oo-ordiTiation of the physiological
mechanisms found \v1th!n the bodies of living organisms may
be accounted for on purely meclmn1cal principles.

no real purpose.

l.

The

th~ng

There 1s

rre call purpose is merely apparent

p. 4 ?leohanism, Life and Personality by J. s. Haldane
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and is in its essential reallty, merely a meohantoal purposeless phye!oo•ohemical
reaction.
.
,
V1 ta lism, on the other hsrio, c la lms the t there is an

essential and fundamental dlfferenoe between
isms and purely inanimate th1ngs.
as to some degree self-evident.

l:hrin~

organ-

They regard this raot
Anyone realizes that those

organisms we see before us are of a different nature than
mere stones.

They admit the phys1nal and chemical con-

stituency of organisms but go on to insist upon the pre•
senoe of an immaterial purposive agency.

Driesch with

his "enteleohy" or vital principle and Bergson with his
"olan vital" or vital force, insist that there is something outside mere physical and chemical laws that gives
life its essential nature and oauseo it to funot1on 1n an

inte111gent,purpos1ve, and harmonious way.

Some v1tal1sts

offer as a proof of vitallsm the fact that we can construct
a grain of wheat with the exact chemical proportions of a
real grain and glve it proper nour1shment but it will not
come up
, and g:row.

We oan compose ari egg, 1dent1dal to the

hon•a, but it ·Will not hatch.

This illustrates the fact

thnt life cones from life and there is nothing that produces llfe within itself.

Of

oou~ee,

the strongest basis

of v1tal1sm is that there is no scientific evidence at all
of the spontaneous genernt1on o!' life

f~om

non-11.fe.

Aga:!.n,

7

as opposed to the denial of purpose or at least, the extreme
skepticism. about it* wh1ch we fh'id in meehs.n1sm, v1te.liem

rests its case on teleolgy and refers to the harmony of

run~

tion snd regularity of nature to substantiate auch a belief.

Theso two views nre, however, ohallenged

~

Uorgan and

others vd.th the oonoept of emergence in biology.

"Th& fact

of emergent evolution !s more conspicuous in the renlm of
orge.ni.sm than in the domain of things.

All the great steps

in evolution - the makinR of the body, the
a brain, the

beginnin~

establish~ent

or

of the blood, the different1at1on of

sense organs,eto., were new syntheses

w~th

new 1ntrins1o

qualities and new extr1ns1o propertiesu. l

Thie idea of

emergence in biology says that the oharaoter1stics of an
organism are novel, and not reducible to physical and ohem1cnl lows.

It is a genoral law of nature that when

res.ch a hlghor degree of

oharacteriattcs not

co'?'l~pleAJ.ty,

expl1~able

co~pounds

such wholes develope

in terms of their parts.

cr..aro.cter1st 1cs a.re called ';emer,CTeni;a".

Such

Life is an eme':"gent

and belongs to the general scheme of emergent evolution.

11

The

naturalistic contention is that, on the evidence, not only
a tons and molecules t but organlsma a:id minrls are suoceptible
of treatment b'v scientific methciis funna"!'t'le-:itall:r of l!ke kJnd1o

1.

P• 206

Concerning Evolution by Thompson

a

that all belong to one tissue of events; and that all exemplify
,
one foundational plan.

In other words, the pos1t1on is that,

in a philosophy based on the prooenure
sanctioned by progress
,
in so1ent1f1o research and thought, the advent of novelty

or

any kind is loyally to be'aooepted whenever it is found, with~

out invoking any extra-natural Power (Force, Enteleohy; Elsn,
or God) through the efficient Aot1v1ty of whioh the observed
faots may be explained." 1 Therefor~, we oan not only do away

.

with mechanism with its insistence of phys1eo-chem1cal assent-

.

ialness but also with v1talism, with its
fluence that gives life.

Whoeler says

out~ide

"we

or al!en in-

are, I believo,

bound to assume that the or;\nnization is entirely the work
of the components themselves and that it 1s not 1n1t1nted end
directed by extraspatial or extratemporal th1ngs•"2

1;
2.

p. 2 Emergent Evolut!on by c. L. Mor~an
P• 159 Essays !n Ph11oeoph1ca1 Biology by Wheeler
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B.

s.

Alexander

In the year 1916, several years before Uorp:an•s "E!!terp:ent

-

Evolution", Professors. Alexander leotured at the University
of Glasgow and gave the first oomprehenslve scheme
evolution.

or

emergent

These· lectures were entitled, "Space, Time and

Deity" and were delivered during a two year period, then published in 1920.

Thera are various things in Alexander's two

volumes on "spaoe 1 .T1me and Deity" that are found essential

to Morgante scheme.

In this section we shall revert to the

most important influences on Lloyd Morgan from Alexander's
theory.
The first thing

Mo~gan

space-time basis for all

retsina from Alexander ls the

r~al1ty,

end the independent exist-

Alexander, in explaining his

ence of the physical world.

philosophical views on nature as a whole, bids us think away
all that has emerged in the course of the evolutionary process.
~

We are to do away imaginatively with ideals and
rational powers and mental abilities.

h1~her

values,

Think away mind itself

with its attributes and oontinue subtracting until the animal
world is obliterated.
ence and reduce the

Let

all 11ving th1ngs :fade from exist-

in~rganio

temporal relationships.

remainder to purely spatio-

This spaoe-time purports to be an

1nexpugnable remainder because it 1s,1mposs1ble to
away beyond this point.

1~ag1ne

This basis must be retained.

lo

It ia evident that Alexander would have to !stop somewhere in this schematic subtracting process for :!.t tro.noends the human l!tind to .roduoe all things to noth1ns.

If we

-

attempt to conceive the world of exietenoo as apace and
time in the traditional sense, it is incomprehensible because we are driven to the question of eesont1al relatedness
between physlcal things on the one hand and space and time on
the other.

Howeve~

it is reducible to spaoe-t1me instead of

space and time and the plausab111ty of

at a later point.

th~s

will be discussed

There 1e rio mere durati.on or mere exten-

sion·-··just apaoe-time.

It follows that 1t is necessary

for Alexander to postulate the oharaoteristice
and he does this from a viewpoint
1onally used for apace itself.
)

or

or

space-time.

oless1f1eat1on trad1t•

He aooepts the triple aspeot

[

or tr1-di~ensional nature
planation a. triadio view
two together

u~t1mately.

or

or

space nnd inoludee in his extimo to enable him to couple the

The first aspect of time is the

fact that it'ie irreversible in direction.

A second aspect

is that each instant is between two·lnstnnts.
in suooession offers a th1rd aspect to fit in

Then, duration
w~th

tri-

dimentional space. · "Now the three features enumerated in
Space and T1.me being 1nnepe,..,dent we m·r s:tht content ourselves
with saying that as between spatiality and successive duration there subsists such a oonneot:!.on of interdependence

11

that eaoh new feature in Time is rendered possible by a new
dimension

or

. 1

Space and convoreely rendoro lt

poosibl~."

Alexander means here th.at the reason why
. Space hns
dimensions is

t~nt

th~ee

,

time ie successive, irreversible, and

un1f orm in direction.
Alexander continues to explain spnce-t1me in the l1r;ht

or

perspectives.

A perepeot1ve epaoo-time is merely the whole

of' epe.ce•t1me as it is related to a point-instant

b~.r

virtue··

of the line of oonneetion between it and other polnt•inetants.
From this I believe we are oo!'reat in assmnlng that n per-

spective in general of space-time from one po1nt-1netant,
differs from the perspective from another point-instant,
whether the perspectives be taken in respect of the instarts
or points, and we see that polnts merge into

pot~ts,

and

instants into instants eaoh because of the other.
Again, we oatoh a glimpse of npe.oe-time through math•
emat1os.

When the universe was in this stage of evolution,

there was latent in this

space-t1~e

all the

poasibl~

geomet-

rlcal and abstract laws that apply
. to space and tlrne,Alexander's
;

empirioal and geometrical spaoe, are identical, because both

types of point-instants have a universal and identical
character or structure.

In reality, we discover these laws

1. p. 51 Space, Time and D&ity by s. Alexander
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of mothmntios and do not invent them•
Morgan does not review the deta11a or

time but aooepts them under the

hea~ing

which we shall see at a later point.

Al~xendor's

space~

of acknowlodg!!:ent,

AlexErnder views timo

as the ''ntlnd" of space and apace as tho "body" of time.

This means thnt we may think of tho rclnt:ton o.r time to
spac~

body.

in the same senee ne vre do the relntion of mind to
The mind is the dyme.nio, driv:tng force of our bodies

and we must look to time as tho r:enerator of all emergents.
The first nnd simplest relation of all existence !a that all

finites are merely oonneoted toFether within the one spaoetime.

Alexander uses the word ''oomprescnce" to explain
this.
,

A thing affects another, with whioh it ia ooropresent, differently, aoaording to the latter's

re~ative

time, or its 1ntr1ne1o recept1v1ty.

position in space or.

Sinoe space-time !s oont-

inous, things sre not out off fro'!!'! orie another, ana a thing
itself. contains other th1nr,:s £Ind ie part ln turn of a larger

complex.

Every finite ie a part wh!oh subsists within space-

tlma and so fal' as it retains its mm lndividual character,
it is aooomodated or adapted to its surroundings in epnce-

time.

Fro~

such early relationships of the . first
. point-

instants, the physical unh,.erso oame 1rto 'being.

A aeoond

lmpo~t~nt

concept of e-nArgenoa.

point

~n

Alnxander's philosop!1y is the

Aloxanoer c1n1mn thnt new "qus.l:ttiee"

13

emerge.

Re would say that at some stage or 1nor6tln1o evol•
"

~tion

.

this or that so-called seoondary quality, such as
"

-

oolor, emerged.

'!hen, at some later stage of the evolun-

bionary process, the quality of

hhe quality of

arose.

oonsoiousn~s!

emergent is a new quality.

11~e em~rged

~~organ

so,

and still later

with Alexattder the

continues the idea

or
"

emergence and attempts to clarify it, as we shall see later,
hhough he views the

as new types of relatedness

emer~en~s

rather than new "qualities".
~enoe

Uorr;an tries to make his emer ...

more inclusive. than is generally impl1od by Ale:xan.derts
"

"quality", whioh does not have

neoesse.r~ly

preceding it as "relatedness" must have.

the same conditions

ttout of one level

. 1

in the heirarohy of levels a new kind of existenoe emerges."

.

Thue we note that in both systems, the concept
basic and that new

or

emergence is

qualitie~

and types of relatedness are th&

things that actually emerge.

Alexander and Morgan both start

with epaoe-time and the resulting em$rgents are considered
supernatural or
which it emerged.

.

supe~enlent

to that le"lfel of existenoe from

:rn both philosophies the inorganic world

comes first, then life, then consciousness; and then mind

emerges.

There is also a parallel between the hierarchy ?f

lev&ls of existence and their repeot:tve orders throughout.
Morgan adopts Alexander's concept of the Wisus •hioh is the

1.

P• 28 Emergent Evolution by c. L. "Morgan
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drive towards Deity.

Tho N!sus begins

tlme and pervades the whole of

emergents to go

a~

e~istenoe.

upwards toward Deity.

the level or spaceIt onuses the

For Alexander, this

N1sus is strictly within the prooese of.' evolution end any

entrance of an outside or alien tnfluenoe.!.s flatly rejected.
Morgan

use~

his scheme.

tho same 1nterpretat1on and adopts the ?Haus for
Tho lTisus towards Delty is

import~nt

scheme and is also essential to t:hat of liorgan.

in Al$xande:r-:ts
It is uaed in

the same oense by Morgan in the effort to weave direction into
emergent evolution.
,
Finally,.Aloxandor•s notion of Deity is employed in
Morgnn•e

evolut~,on.
#

or

lTot only do they agree on the emergence

,

,

matter, life, mind and values in this order, but the goal

towards which all of the evolut1onsry process is heading is

the eame---that of Deity.

"On the one hand we have the total-

ity or the world, which 1n the end !.s apntio-te1-nporal; on the

other the quality of De1ty

~n~endered,

gendered, within that whole.

or rather being en-

These two features are united

in the conception of the whole world aa expressing itself in
the character of deity and 1t is th!a and not bare Space•

Ttme which for speculation is the 1.deal oonoopt1on of God.u
We see the inclusiveness and yot the tra!'!scondent

ch~raot

eristlos of Deity in a similar stato':':1ent from 'Morgan.

l.

P• 354 Space, Time nnd Deity by s. Alexander

1

"We may
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aoknowledge physical events as '1lt1mately involved; and God
. l

on whom all evolutionary process ultimately depends."

Thus,

Deity is 1noluded within the evolutionary processes and ia
also the goal towards wh1oh the Nisus is driving all emergents.
In Chapter five, we shall review some points wherein Morgan
~

and Alexander are in opposition but from this brief'- review,
we see that Professor Alexander with his concepts of spaoo~

*

•

ti

J

,

time, emergence, emergents, order,- 'Nisus, non•alien

1nflu~noe,

and Deity played a tremendouc influence upon Lloyd Morgan.

l. P• 298 Entergent Evolution by c.

Le Morgan
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CHAPTER II
EMERGE1TT EVOLUTION

To Morgan, the concept
in the field

or

biology

b~t

phys ioal eoheme or things.

or

emergence not only applies

extends though the entire metaIn his attempt to clarify his

position, he bids us think of a pyramidal soheme (Fig. l).

At its baae lies space-time and this extends throughout the
entire pyramid of existence.

Every event thnt occurs does

so within the limits of space-time.

t

Fig. 1
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From minute point-instants in

spaoe~time

emerged electrons

.

and when these entered into the!.r elnborate structures, atoms
emerged.

These atoms combined in suoh fashion as we know them

now, and the ph7sioal world emerged from them.

This is the

view of Alexander and it takes us up to the dotted line in
Fig. l. Here is where Morgante view fits into the scheme.

He

did not attempt to show how the physical order emerged but

puts it under what is kn.own in his philosophy as rraoknowledgment" • "Now for better or worse my notion of philosophy is

that; while it involves the contributions of science in all
departments, it should seek to express a constructive scheme
of the world -· a consistent scheme which is , conceived at a
level or refl~otive th?ught that supplements, though it does
not supersede, scienoe.

There r.niet be nothing 1n. this scheme,

which is discrepant with soienoe; but, on this understand1.ng,
there must be oonst1tut1ve features whloh complete the ?ther- ,
wise incomplete delivery of strictly ec1ent1f!o tho·ught., That,
I think has always been the aim of philosophy.

feel sure, continue to be 1 ts aim.

constructive creed and not only a

It. seeks .to
wor~ing

I want to nail my colours to the mast.
1

lieve in a phys1onl world."

~ot ioe

he believes in a physical world.

It will, I
~evelop

polioy.

In

a

e~y

case,

In oredal terms, I bel!organ ts s ta temen t that

He admits th.at this is be•

1. P• 59 Emergent Evolution by c. L. Morgan

1a

yond proof but is so evident that ·it deserves to have place
in the plan of evolution, so he places i t under his heading
of "a oknowledgment".

The stress in emergent evolut1on is on the

the new.

incomln~

of

"There may be resultants without emeraenoei but
.•

Then, 1t may be

there are no. emerrrenta without resultants.

said that through resultants there is cont1.nuity in prof?ress t
1

through omergepoe there is progress in continuity."

It is

evident that things slrendy in ex!.stenne oan produce already

known resultants and it ls a m!soonception to ascribe novelty
to those resultants thst really are not new.

But, every time

an emergent emerges, 1t necessarily oauseB new resultants because of its unique oharncter.

Morgon illustrates the con•

oept of ·emergence in th1a way.

Assume that the chemist has

some liquid hented·to a h!r:;h temperature.

Gradually the

liquid is cooied:and slowly crystals begin to form that are
new.
1J:l~

Those crystals were a.Arived fror.:t the li.qu1n yet ncthcould be paralleled or expl1cnblo between tbe oharo.cter-

. '·

· 1s'f ios ·of

the· two ... so it 1e 1n the evolut!onary process.

Things, when they attain a certain degree of complex1ty,
b:t-anch off or emerge into

someth1nr: new•

A~a ~ n

in the case

of the gases, oxygen .and hydroaen, we see an example of this.
When the two are combined in a certain fashion something now
and different evolves.

It oame from the oT.yr,en and

1. P• 3l Emergent Evolution by
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but you onn not characterize it in the former stage before the
actual emergence

becaus~

its complexity has not emerged into

a separate unique thing ..
Within the whole of our

P7!'"~m1dal oohe~e,

taking place in smaller pyt'amida.
,

"

emergence is

There
. are three ma in

emergents ...... matter, life, and m:!nd.

But in addition to

these, an almost infinite number of little emergents evolve.
Perhaps here it is best to introduce or explain the :"n.isus"

towards Deit1 symbolized by the arrow towards Deity in:our
diagram..

Th~s

nlsus concept is the idea that all emergents

have a trend'., upward toward Deity.

Eaoh emergent hns its re-

lative level within the pyramid and this presupposes a hierarchy of emergents. ·The nJsus .bel1.ef la that th~ emerr,:ent

trend is forward or towards the

h1~her

or "more".

This iM-

plies that the physical world existed before life, life before mind, and so on.

!'!organ belie•1es this niaua :!s pulling

or d1root1ng everything to tho highest possible emergent --Deity.

"It seems, as ! think on the evidence, that the
1

higher we ascend in the h1ernrohy --- and especially when
when we reach human porsons

. is suoh that it

appe~rs

:sons are quite alike.
pro~uot

.

--- the emergent coMplexity

justlf 1nble i::o say the t no two perEe.oh person is an uniquely 1nd1v1diml

along one of very many lines or.aavonce --- say

.

.

Shakespeare, Goethe, Newton, end Darwin.

If this be so, t.he

n1sus towards deity on its strictly central

l~.ne

should cul-
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CHAPTER III
EMERGENT EVOLUTION CONT'D.
Now that we see that the emerr.r,ents pursue higher d1reot1ort; we may disouss

th~

relation of the em&rgent to that

from which it bas emerged.

"Each higher

supernatural to that wh1oh precedes it.
is supernatural to the 1nortr,i:.n1o."
Keeping 1n mind the

n~sus,

l

sta~e

1s in turn

In this sense life

we oan easily eeo that

enoh now emergent would in this sense

be above, or super-

natUl"al to,. the thinp; from which it has emerged.

Tho concept

of involution will throw further light upon this relationship.
~

.

ttL1f& stands to matter inAeame kind of relation as mind
,

.

stands to life.

-

And this, I subm1t 1 onn be better expressed

by saying that life involves a basis of matter just as mind

involves a basis

or

life.

which I cnll involution."

2

The relation common to both is that
Involution indicates a state of

1. P• 29 Enier,:r,ent l!!volut!on c. t. Horgan
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complioation or
volved.

~htang1ement.

It 1s a state or being in-

In emergent evolution, eaoh emergent level in aeoend-

ing order cannot oome into be
. in~ eave as "involving" the level
or levels that are below it. Or, we mtght sa,y that eaoh new
~

emer~snt

must be preceded

associated.

by

other

emer~ents

w1th wh1oh it 1s

With Morgan then, involution 1s used in a sense

of dependence.

At any given level, the manner in which nat•

ural events run their course nepends on the_ type or kind or
relatedness which has emergen at thnt level.

In other words,

life oou1d not have evolved except for the pre•existenoe of
matter, because the conoept and reality.of life itself necessarily involve an existence of matter.

In like manner th&

emergent, mind, involves the lover leve!I., life, and with
each; emergent eome,preceding or 10V1er lovel :ts involved.
'•!.•:

' ••

> •• .. ~ -,::·. ••

Thie sense of connection and dep~~denoe is called 1nvolut1on in Morgan's

~rersion

ot emergent evolution.

Tho oon-

oept or involution is particularly important in asoertaining
the order of emergents .for we oan observe which emergents al.'e

.

involved or dependent upon other emergentj.
For example, life
,
!e not dependent upon oonsoinuancss, but oan exist before 1t
and independently of it.

But, aonseiouenese oan not exist

before life, neither onn !t 6Xist apart from 1t,
involution•
th.$,

This is

Again we catch some idea of the relation 0£

emergent e.nd th.at from which 1t is ·emerged.

"If one

23

says 1 in teohnioal

usa~e,

that crystals are emergent in a

cooling
solution, one
implies that they were not actually
,
.
thel'e, ox- anywhere, prior to such emer('l'.enee. Then and there
they just oome es something new, so -rsr as that solution is

ooncerned.

This does not mean that they

oo~e

into

be1n~'out

of noth1ngt fol" they come into being out of the oooiing liquid.

'Nonc:t the less, as crystals, they are new for they were not
.
l
actually in existence aforetime."
So we see there is a
direct connection between the two but that the emergents are
not direct descendants of those things from wh!oh they emerge.
'Now that we have summarized the view of the process of

emergence and its nisus, th1s question follows.
Morgan ala1ms to be emergent?

new kind of relation.

What is it

It is some new re1atedness or

It seems that this new emerged relation

would bo abstract but it· is not so with Morgan.

It is oonorete.

Every emergent then• 1s :tn reality a dlfferent or new type of
relatedness.

Relatedness includes·not only relation-of•te:r-is

but terms-1n-relet1on.

That 1e, not only does the new emerg-

ent possess a rEtlat1on amonp: othe:r
nal relatedness as well.

emer~ents,

1t has an inter-

Morgan uses the term "1ntr1ns1c" to

denote relatedness within the 'mique e:vstem of the emergent
(terms in relation), and the word "extr1ns1o" for relntion1n•terms (relation to eone other system).

1. p.12 The Emergence ot Novelty by
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There are many

L. Morgan

types or both kinds of, relatedness
and the different
kinds
,
,
suoh as ooneoiousness. life, ohem1oo-phys1oal, spatial and
temporal relations

ma~

exist , independently or they may be

In other words, one

ao~ex1stent.

or new relatednews

em~rgent

doea not necessarily exclude another.
What causes theee emergents to emerge?

It 1s an all•

inclusive Activity or f'oroe that 1e purposive and d1reot1ve.

God or Activity is the source of all evolutionary· events and·
is

~ers!stent

mid..

from the baso to the apex or our proposed pyra-

Mor'gan frankly accepts Activity under his ooncept of'

"Acknowledgment"

rather than attempting to prove the point.

causation and causality need to be distinguished although
they are not contradictory.

causation startsJ causality

.

continues or 1s the snrna..or happenings.

Morgan, unlike

,

Berkeley, who denies any diff'erenoe, d1.f'ferent1ates the two,
but .claims tba t no gulf exists between them and that they be•
.
"

long to

th~

same realm.

So in an ultimate sense, God or

Activity ia causation and causality.

causality 1a not external

to the pyramid but is in· its limits.

In faot• there is no

alien influence

w~atsoever

events in any way.
philosophy

"

that alters or affects evolutionary

Here we detect a carry-over trom Morgan•s

or biology. He rejects the outside push or the

v1talist an11ns1sts that all reality lies within the pyramid.
"Any insertion into phys1co-ohem1oa1 evolution of an alien in•
tluenoe which must be evoked to explain the phenomena of 11.f'e
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1a expl1o1tly rejeoted under the concept of emergent evol•
ution."

l

We find that Morgan uses the word$ proj1oienoe, inter~

'

ven1enoe, and advenience to give us a clue to relatedness.
Projio1ence is attained only on the

~ental

level.

volves th& distanoe•reoeptor-pattern of vision.
ce~tual re~erenoe OO'tJ\plad

It in•
It is per-

with d1stanoe•reoeptors.
.

"My

doctrine 1s that all that is minded is within us, and rounded
primarily on the correlated outcome of rooaptor-patternsJ that
th.er~ a~e

physical things existent 1n their own right outside

us in a hon-mental worldf and that the properties wh1nh render
them objective in mind are proj1c1ently referred to these
. 2

Morgan means here that outside our individual world

things."

of existence lie things different from the mental aspect of
~

ourselves, which are a result or peroeptual reference and disWhen we refer to them, we• 1n a sense,

tanc••recepto~s.

attach a minded quality to the actual physical reference and

.

this reference from our mind! to those things
that do not in•
.
volve the mental, is oalled proj1o1enoe. Projioient reference
enables uo to ascribe to the v,.aual field more
. than what is
actually included 1n the

distanoe~reoeptors.

For example,

!t I hold a coin in my hand and turn it until I actually only
see an elliptical shape instead of a circular shape, the distance receptors enable me to see that one part of the object

!. P• 12 Emergent i%o1ut1on t>y b. t. Margart
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is·· farther
away than another, but it does not appear round,
,

But, I. know tltt'ough past experience snd general
knowledge
,

that a thing like a round
ooin may be tilted, but not lose
,
1ts essential oharacter, so I see the oo1n 1n my mind as
being oiroular although 1t arpears to me to be el.liptioal.
This is projloient reference.

proper~1es

The

I ascribe to

tba eoitt at'e oe.lled projio1ent properties,
,Ort«'.

of these pro-j!o1ent propert1eti br1np;s ';lP the hit'!•

toricnl controversy of 1deal1!m and

Let

'U8

~ealism

oonoern1ng color,

look briefly " at this oontroveray and, discuss Morgan•s

views ooneern1ng it•

Profeiu1o:r John Laird, who 1e a realist,

believes that beautiful colors and nensationa are
.. there
whether any personal mind appreciates 1t or not. "A romantic
revival may be needed to reveal the stateliness of Gothic
,
cathedrals or the serene grandeur

or

Alpine summits; butthia

beauty and the worth of it belonged to the Alps and the
1
~
aanotua_ries a~l' the time•"
vre note that ftf!- the realist,

color is not dopondent upon the mind.

On the other hand the

1aeal1st maintains the '~1ew that oolor must be peroeived by

some mind bei'ore., :tt, '.becomes a ):"ea11ty.
..

~ompany

with both the

ar; -sense.

l. P•

;:''

1~6

1de~11st'b

Lloyd Morgan parts

and the rea;1et1e viewpoh1t in

We l"!Ot1oe that, 1n· his

departure~

Study in Realism by J. Laird

be still en;.

2'7

dorses the realistio 1mpl1oat1on from a pragmatio standpoint.

"Beyond question we eot tas if•

this thing or that or !ts very own

~olour

~1jht.

would generally reault in oonfua1on."

belongs to

To aot otherwise

But he goes beyond

realism and idealism in msinta1n1nfl: that "Colour-perception

involves certain pb:y's1olog1oal

ohnn~es

in the brain at the

level of liteJ this again involves (if any reliance can be
placed in the outcome of research in the field of colour. vision) certain apeo1al1eed phye1co-ohem1oal obs.nges in the
retina on the choroid, or (more comprehensively) in the
2

retina cerebral system."

"Thus at the top we fringe off

into correlated oonsoioueneas, aeetheth1oally

•qu~litied',

and at the·bottom we fringe off into the physical.

There

an; enchained set or events,

subj act to emergence, from
.
. 3
bottom to top, and the beauty of colour is struck out."

js

~

"If the idealists assert that colour lives only at top in
the mind
irrespective of phys1oel correlates in the or,
ganism, or 1f the realia t assert the t 1t lives only at
bottom in the thing, irrespective of physical correlates
in the organism, I, respectfully submit that eaoh goes be-

yond the evidence,

According to the evidence (if I
;

no

not

misread it) oolour lives in the whole s 1tuat1on; 1n other
words it has being

m virtue ot the extrinsic rolatedness

!. P• 227 ltiiiergent Evolution by
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as

or person (body•m1nd) and th1ngJ but that which haa being
•

hi virtue or extrinsic

1

relatedne~e I

a quality intr1ns1o to the thing."

as nn emergent quality.

call a

not

pro~erty,

Color then, 1a accepted

nowevorl llorgan holds that the

instrument (the eye) 1s necessary to interpret the color.
We may oonolude that Morgan is neither an extreme 1doal1st

or realist here but aooepts the essentials

or

both.

Thes$

proj1o1ent properties go tG mako up proj1o1ent re.terenoe,
and produce the beauty of the rainbow and the other aea-

thetio enjoyments that we experience.
"Adven1enoe" 1s meant to represent the physioal 1n..,
fluence on the plane or mtitter.
ship or physical ex1stenoes.

It is simply the relation•

The relationship,

ven1enoe and projioienoe on the plan&
needs further discussion.
"!ntervenienoe"•

or

ad•

betw~en
~

life, however,

This , relationship 1a oalled

Morgan states, "The position then is

that advenient physical 1nfluenoe oalla fo:rth in the or•
ganism a very complex system of 1nterven1ent

ev~nte

with

psyohioal correlatesJ that theee events oulm:tnate in be-

havior towards the source from wh1oh the advenient 1ntiuenoe ~was er:riuent; and that projic!ent referonoe endows
tbe thing with nll the meaninft, tbet aoorues under

Qorrela-

tion, as the nat·result of all interven:tent events, thus

r.
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rendering the acknowledged thing li.n object of perception,
which,. for our reflective thought, is always in some mea.
' 1

sure oonoeptualised.".

\Ve nee thnt there exists a complex

integrated system of intervenient processes on the inter•
mediate plane of life.

Those

life-processes

interven1c~t

are involved in all proj1o1ent reference.

in, the .organism and exist as

.

l~nks

They ooour with·

between the phys !eel e.nd

mental, "they sre the intrinsic physical and physiological
attributes of events which in their

. 2

~aych1cal

attribute

have the quality of aonso1ousness."

The question is rs1eea now oonoerning the meaning of
oonso1ousness •. It seems !\forgan uses the term oonsoiouaness
below the. level of mind.

Not only does

oonae~.ousneas

exist

here·, we may follo\'f it in. emar~ent evolution on down toward

the bottom of our pyramid.
ates which purport to be
lower levels.

Horgan
ascribetJ psychical oorrel•
.

i

posse~e1ng

'

"awareness" even in the

"But can it confidently be asserted th.at only

at a. oorta1nlevcl
of neural rhnotioning or even that only
,
in organic functioning does correlation obtain?

If· th1s

question be regarded as too speculative, let us ask:

now

far down ton the inside so to speak• does oorrelntion extend

in us?

There is at any rate

so~eth!ng

to be said for the

view that no limits can be set to its downward oxtension;

1. 1'·
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that not only receptor-patterns but all the phye1co-ohemical
chan~es

they involve have psyoh1oal correlates wh1oh it not

directly still 1nd1reotly contribute to oonso!ous

"awarene~s"J

that just as physical novelty involves the Qontinuance of
lower levels of physical existence so does psyohioal novel·ty
involve a oont1nuenoe of lower levels of psychical e:id.stenoe."
Again, Morgan goes no farther to prove th1s assertion.
placed under aoknowledgment.

It is

When proj1c1enoe takes plaoe it

has been preceded by edvenience and 1nterven1enoe •

The

existence of consciousness or awareness may however- precede

the neural or organic levels of existence.

i., P• 308
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CHAPTER IV

EMERGENT EVOLUTION (CONT'D)
"In the natural course of evolutionary advanoe, one
may say that life is emergent on non-living matter"

1

MorRants

view is that life is superven!ent upon nature or thst the
emergent lite, followed after the phys1oal world was in exThings of a physioal nntu~e were being continued

istence.
by

Activity e.nd being drawn upward by the Ntsue and when a

certain degree of complex1.ty we.s
form

or

atta~ned

!n the h! ~est

inorganic th1np;s, life came forth as a new emergent.

Vlbat 1s the d1fferent1s of life?

Thie queatlon is said to

be unfair and irrelevant by Morgan.

"Those who would single

out from among the multitudinous differentiations of an
evolving universe

th~s

alone for special interposition would

seem to do little honour to the Dtv1..nity they profess to serve."

we
1.

2.

note that there are no great

~aps

or distinction between

Emergent Evolution by c. t.
P.• 84 The Interpretation of Nature
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these emergents..

They are simply i_n aooorde.noe with the gen-

eral scheme of emergent evolution.

Inorganic

emer~ents

a certain state and life en1err:ed supervenient to 1t.
earlier stage 1 life was

or

reached

In 1 ts

course very primitive and it grad-

ually began to take on new hor:tzol'\e and develop11 ftself through
Activity and the Nisus to the
perience today.

kind of

h~ ~hast

form of 11 fe that we ex-

Life_. when 1 t emerged, was an entirely

TI8W

relatedness and therefore caused a new set-up of re-

lations throughout the worla of existence.

Thou~h

it came

from the inorganic; it was unique and d!fferent.in its essential

nature, as are all genuine emargente, and
terms· of nature.

However.

~-torgan

life."

*

not explicable in

of "living"
from the non-living to

uses the example

radium atoms to try to f 111 in the 11nk

the living.

1s

" ••• as I put it, coT1soiousnese 15 superven1ent on

The upward

develop~ent

of life and the complex cell

advancement finally broke off into a unique phenomeTion wh1oh
we call eons ioouenese.
here as an

emer~ent.

Thus, we note that oonso1.ousness 1s used
In the last chapter, we citen where

seemed to bel:t.eve that it preceded life..

Mor~an

As be!.ngs beoeme aware

of things and other bei'l"lgs, development was oorrespond1ngly
·accelero tea end another
and

m~nd

emerged.

hi~h

~.

~omplex'

ty was at ta :!.ne~,

It wae larp:ely the capacity and ab111. ty

the eye that brought this

I.

degree or

emer~ent

49 !mergen€ Evolution by
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The nervous system

Morgan

33

developed and the physical basis (brain) of m1.nii was

before this main emergent took plaoe.

~ntaot

Morgan oan not seem

to decide whether this emergent oooured 1n the animal
or the human body.

He made a lengthy

~tuay

or~an!sm

of snJmals and

proved certain "mental" powers to be in their possession.
"One may picture the organism

stnrtin~

with a certain amount

of congenital automatism of the more or less def:tnite in•
stinotive

typ~

or

and paosing on to reach a certain amount

the acquired automatism of habit.

l

The latter state is in
.

part auperadded elements as well."

These 1nst1nots oan be

howeve~

"The foundations of

developed to a high degree.

ani'Clal intelligence rest on individual choice or eelect1on 1
2

which in turn is dependent upon assoo1at1on."
some

; He assumes that

animals do have :!ntell:t!:?'.ence and offers mai:iy 111uetrat1ons

and experiments to substantiate this view, , but f!nally concludes
that. they are incapable ·of reasonini:;.

So, the th1ncr. that

differentiates the "mind" of the anima 1 from the t of the
hut00.n is the power to reason, but mind 1n the sense of intell..:.

igenoe orginieted in the animal realm.

"The evolutionary

ascent of mind bas been as I believe, an advance

throu~h

3

products to further novelty."

This means that

new "nevmese" and ·arose superveniont on 11.fe.

1. p. 142
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m~.nd

is a

new
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Is reason an emergent or is it a development of the
"

innate capacity of mind?

Morgan lndioates that it,

with other 11 ttle pyramids' is an. em(')r;r,an.t.

~long

nwhen this kind

of reflective procedure cbaractises the life of a rational

being• have we here the emergence of something
new in mental development?

~.believe

we have."

~onerally

1

Emergent

evolution believes there are oh!ef emergents and those which
emerr~ents

are considered as little
the large ones.,

wt thin tho boundaries of

Reason is a small emeri:tent under one of the

main emergents • mind.

Therefore, some lower forms of speoies

may possess a mind and oonso!ousness but not be influenced by

the emergent, reason• · In the development or

unfo1d1.n~

memory we get a good clue to the ascent of m1nd.
is evident that there had to be

so~eth1ng

ooourence .... this, Morgan onlle a

was by definition capable

or

or

First1 it

to exparienoe an

"re~ister".

"rei::.1strat1on".

The rep;1ster

When the reg-

ister was able to retatn something- in its consciousness and

cons 1der it 1 nretent1on" was being introduced.

If at a later

stage the same registration could be recalled to minn,
'~l'tevival"

was employed.

Revival also might have been stimu-

lated by something outside the register and if it strongly

invoked the register's attention, ttrecogn1t1on" was developed.
Finally "reference" was existent when the original registration

1. P•
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could be classified •
.The mind is capable of a high degree of development.
Morgan gives good instructions and theory concerning this.
"Mental development is not only a matter of cognition but
.

also of the emotions and the w111."

1

Values and aesthetic

oapaoities are unfolded after mental

emer~enoe,

and we are

in a trend to receive more and more as the evolutionary
process continues.

"Emer~ent

evolution works upwards from

matter, through life, to oonaoiousnees wh!ob attains in man
its highest reflective or supra-reflective level.
2

It eocepts

the •more t at each aseendini:i: stage."
The nisus is attracting everything towaras Deity.

But

before we view this oonoept, let us note again the essential
nature of emergence within our scheme.

ot

"Just as a oomb1nat1on

two gaaes, ·oxygen and hydrogen, results in the production

of water; having new properties, or as the chemist creates a

new carbon compound by sj'l'lthesis, so man is
new-"

3

somethin~

gen1unely

It is to be noted that Morgan claims that each ascend•

ing emergent 1s evolved "with" and not merely "from", just as
the crystals are emergent with the liquid.

This diffioult

point in Morgan•s ph!loeophy may be more clearly understood 1f
we realize tba t the new emer.o;ent,

thou~h

it is in a sense re-

la tcd to thet from which it is emerged, is unique and ls a new

1. P•
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type of relatedness.
Now,

we

shall consider briefly the apex of our pyram1d---

De1ty or God.

First we see God as directive Activity.

This

is a force pervading all of emergent evolution wh1ch aims at
constructive consistency.

The "manner o.f going" in all nat-

ural events ultimately depends upon this Aotivity.

Secondly,

Morganr- uses Dod as 1adentioal with the N1sus that dl'aws all

things upward.

"God as being, is the n1sus of the universe

. pressing onwards to levels as yet-unattained, or as I should

·1

prefer to say, is the
of events."
. Nisus dirent1ve of the course
.
In the third place 6 we view God as Eff1o1ency.

"But there may

be something 'more in the heart of events than s,1oh :ieffeot:tve-

ness----namely that wh,oh one may speak

or

aa Eff!oienoy-----

something more than oeusat1on, wh!oh I shall call Causality-something more than dependence wb1oh I oapitalize

-

ence~"

ae Uepend-

(We are to assume here that Dependenoe refers to the

evolutionary process and not to Godl nin virtue or this;

should it be aooepted, not only does something happen under

erreotiveneas, but all that is emergent has being through
.
.
Effioienoy. This, which of course may be rejected, is; for
'

those who take the risk of the higher acknowledgment, the
2

Creative source or evolution•-- this is God."
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God 1e eternal,,
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but

!'in~s

.oonoept

expression vt1 thin the pyramid of being.

The entire

Of. God 1s included under ?.~organ's ''aoknowledg:nent" •

The concept of Spirit desorvos cona1derat10n here

be~

oauee !t is an important aspect of Lloyd Morgan's evolutionary hypothesis enc because 1 t has oormeot1on with the iC!ea
and .concept of God.

It 1s mentioned 1n "Emergent Evolution"

but. a more detailed discuss ion is found 1n "I,1fe, Mind and
Spirit,., wh:!.ch 1e a later work.

to

~1stingu1sh

life and m1na from Spirit I seek also to use

d1st1not1ve words.
Spirit•.

"Since it ls part of my aim

Hence, I speak of •manifestations of

But Spirit 1s nowise separable from life and mind,

nor they from 1 t.

What is g1.ven for reflective oontemplation

is.a world-plan of natural events.

I hold that this world-

plan is a manifestation of Divine Purpose.

We human folk are,

in lire and mind, integral parts of that world-plan.

We t?o,

are manifestations of Spirit. . which is 'revealed' within us •

Each of us is a life, a mind, a Spirit and instance or life

.

.

as one extlreasion of world-plan, of mind, as a ditf'erent expression of that world-plan of Sp!ri t in so far as the Sub-

$tanoe

or

.

that world-plan is

reveele~

w'th1n us."

l

Th& world-

pls.n or evolutionary process from the loweet form of inorganic matter or

or

spaoe-t!~e

Spirit or of God,

event to ne1ty ls a •'manifestation"

Then, Spirit is being partially revealed

1. P• 32 Life, Mind and Spirit by c. L. Morgan
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in you and me.

I say, partially because we are only an

individual instance of that whioh 1n full
is universal.

manifestation

But not only are you and I manifestations

of Spirit, even the emergence and development of the rose
is in accordance with Divine purpose a.nd weaves 1ts part

into. the great pattern

or

evolution.

We notioe then that

Spirit is not something emergent or divorced from life and
mind but something that pervades the entire world of existence and causes it to develop in a teleological, harmonious

way.

It seems that Morgan feels that evolution alone is

insuffioent and·beoauee the realization of this 1nadequaoy
is so pertinent, he injeot·e. the idea

or

Spirit, whlch

supple?l'lents and is an indissoluble part of ea<'!h
emergent evolution.

Mor~an

.replies to the assertion that

evolution might bring disastrous results to
this way.

or

sta·~e

reli~ion

1n

"There is no disjunctive ant1thesls or evolu-

tionary progress and Divine purpose.

The question: Is

there one or the other, has no meaning if there always be

one with the other.

My ohief conoern is to present the

point of view of one who accepts both."

l

This is an attempt

to make the natural and supernatural not only continous but
equally divine and the expressions or man1fentat1ons inherent within our pyramid are an expression and manifestation

1.
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of Spirit whioh ultimately is God.

4:0

SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS II, III and IV

To explain adequately the
general scheme or
,

Ll~y~

Morgan•s emergent evolution, a,pyramidal scheme must be

.

introduced.

Everything that takes place, does so.within

the limits of

th~

There cannot by anr type or

pyramid.

alien influence or force outside that affects the happen-

ings inside.

At the base of the pyramid ts space-time.

Alexander tries to account for the emergence ot matter
from this 1nexpugnable basis but Morgen merely aooe·pte it
as· a !"aot that cannot be proved •.

~Jorgan

introduces the ·

idea of "acknowledgment" to reoonolle such things as the
'

inorganic world and activity. ·He uses the concept of 'acknowledgment because ·he. feels :tha_t

ly explained without 1t.

th1np;~

are not adequate-

To have a complete comprehensive

.

system, acknowledgment of . certain things 1.s an essential •
In the evolutionary scheme, there are countless resultants
'

and emergents.

Resultants may

o~our

without emergents but

emergents always cause new resultants •. The law of emergence
does not coincide with the general idea of evolution.

Emer-

'

genoe in biology and in other spheres of the evolutionary
'

set-up means

tha~

.

the arrival of a new th1ng, broken off from

a high degree of .comple:d. ty :tn the preoed1ng

etage.

It is ·
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exemplified
crystals.

by

the oooliti5 of a hot 11qnt.<l sr.::11 the emcr,;ins

The relation of the crystals is not altogether

foreign.because they actually emert;e

!£2'!

!.ll.h the liquid

lti but the crystals are certainly different and unique

am have new form, so they are said to be
~ine

TIOt

pointing towards the apex

or

The

emer~ents.

the pyramid 1s intended

to symoblize the n1sus or force that la rull1np; the entire

process of evolution towards De!ty.

It causes

emer~ent

evolution to want the "more" and the more or test. 1e found
t.owards the apex of the pyramid.

The thing that Morgan

· actually claims to be emergent ie a new tvpe of re la teanesa.

There may be extrinsic or intr!ns1c relatenness, but the
emergent oomes as a novelty from the preceding state
affairs.

One wonders about the. oe.uee of omerp:enoe.

or·
Morgan

different la te·s between cause. ti on a11d aausa 11 ty, as being the
starting and oontlnu1ng of the process respectively.

The

source of emergent evolution 1s Aot1v1ty which is 1noluded
under aoknovrledgment.

In further explanation of emergence,

the throe different types of relatedness are

used.

Pro•

j1o1enae is that relatedness that le obta!ned only on a

mental level.

It is perceptual reference coupled with

distance-receptors.

It enables us to view a th1nR on a

higher level than the bare phyeioal.
physioal influence on the plane

o~

Advenienee 1s the

matter such as the epaoe

relationship between physical objeots.

Intervenienoe is a
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type of relatedness found on the plQne of life.

The inter•

venient processes are essential to the projio:lent proces$eS
'

,

because life emerged before mlnd.
are the chief emergents.
emer~ed

Matter is acknowledged, ana life

after the inorganic prooess had

~egree

of complexity.

as the

~eneral

atta~.ned

Life is auperven1ent to

a high
,

~stter,

but

law of emerrrence states, it. is· not explicable

in terms ot matter.
othe~

.

Matter, life, and mind

emergents.

There is no greater gap here· thnn in the

The same general law

charaoter1~ea

the en•

tire process. · Coneoiouaneen 1e oors1dered ao a forerunner
of mlnd and it too, is an emorp;-ent..

In the ascent of mind,

one of the main factors was 1n the oomplex·development of
.

~

. ' .:

.

.

"

',

..... ~·~

'.·.·

the nervou.a· .system, largely the: eye. · When:~the pcroeividng, ·
prooess was highly developed, mind emerged to recall the
perceptions, and to function in an

entirely,.ri~w

rElalm.

Animals are considered to have :lnte111genoe but not rational

powers, although Morgen 1o not

reason.

The unfolc1ng or

ao~atio

da~relop'ng

register, the reg1etre.t1on,

~he

recognition and the reference.

1n denying them all

of memory involves the .

retention, the revival,- the

God ts used in several wa7sJ

first, as the directive Activity;

"

seoon~ly,

-

as the i'l!aus;

third, es the Efficients and f1nally 1 as Causality.
process of emergent evolution started

a~d

The

generated by Ood
,

is heading upwards to Him·~~d dur1n~ this acco~pliehment,
things ·exist and

.develop'.~and

new emergents are eupervenient
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to them.

The oonoept of Spirit is used as the Divine Plan

or way in wh1oh everything progresses.
festations" of God.
a~tist

It is the "mani-

The most subtle appreciation of the

or the poet, the highest aspiration of the saint, are

no less accepted than the blossom of tho water-lily, the
o~ystalline

fabr1o of a snow-flake or the small 1ntr1oate

structure of the atom.

The theory of

emer~ent

evolution

urges that the "more" of any given stage, even the '"''highest,
involves the less of the
tinues to exist with it.
in terms of the lower.

sta~es

which preceded it and con-

It doea not interpret the higher
This would imply the deniGl of the

emergence of those new modes of natural relatedness which
characterize the higher and make it whnt it ls.

All thinga

are upon the river of evolution floating towards deity and
final development.

CHAPTER V

MAJOR DIFFEREUCES OF .'MORGAN AND ALEXANDER

In the eeoond section of ohapter

on~,

way in which Alexal'"lder 1nf'luenoed Morgan.

we

oo~sidcred

We

shall now d!s-

ouss briefly, not the mutual concepts ano 001.noiding
but the points wherein

Mor~an

and Alexander dissgrPe.

the

elements,

A

divergence is fou~d in the interpretation or· the status of

sense-data.

Alexander says:

0

In our ord1,.,ary experience of

color, the oolor is separate froM the mtnd and completely
independent of it.

In our experience of the oolor•s be-uty
. 1

there is indissoluble union with the mind."
Alexander tends

to~ards

realism here for he

I think
~eans

that oolor

resides in the thing seen, w~ th whioh an organism having the:
quality of oonsoiousness may or ma7 not be oompresent.

In

other words, oolor to Alexander is intrinsic to the thing as
its own emergent quality.
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color to the entire pyramid of the whole situation both
mental ·and physical.

Thus, we see that

:t.!or~an

rejedts·

the view that oolor 1s an 1ntrins1o quality of the thing

beonuee the higher level (mind) 1s neoeaaary.
leans

he~v1ly
'

toward realism.
. .

Alexander

Morgan leans in the opposite
.

~

.

\

'.

d,1rect1on toward$ .1dea).ism, at least in his 1ns1stanoe that

the psychical faotor is necessary for the existence of oolor.
This divergence. leads farther~·: Alexander postulates a

·non..;menta.l world in which colors, odors and sounds are
emergent qua.11 ties..

This is opposed by Morgan.

"I am oon-

oerned to state distinctly that a sense-datum is
not, fol"
,
my interpretation, a gift until it is received, and that
the person as recipient;
only has 1t when !t reaches him•"
,

1

With Alexander; it seems that the secondary qualities emerge
right along "''!th the emergent but Mo:rgan we 1ts until
mind
,

bas

emer~od

in order to npprehend these

qua~1t1es,

and. they

are not real until a m1nd has reoeived them.

T'ne God Concept of both thinkers cono1dee 1n one respect (?Tisus) 1 but ltorgan's idea

or

God diff'ers in many ways

from that of AleY..ander. · Ale,ce.nder oonsidors Deity as an

emergent quality toward which everything is yoarn1ng but

never attains.

1. P• 42

"God as actually possessing deity doea not

Emergent Evolution by c .. L. Morgan

46

exist but ie an ideol~ 1e always beoomi_n~a but God as the
l

whole universe

t~nd~ng tow~rds de~ty

does exist."

Thus

we note thnt deity 1s the goal that is never attained.
1a thE:l whole pyramid tending tovlards

th~_s

emergent quallty.

Lloyd Morgan considers God as soMething in a
t~e

God

se~ae

outside

yearning and striving, as He seems to be represented as

having already attained what the prooess is tending toward.
"If one may claim that acknowledgment
of God• on whom all
.

tlatural events in their asoent, notwithstanding lapses to
lov1er levels, are untimately dependent, is less permissible

at the bar ot philosophy than that other aoknowledgment of

a physical world, our current

e~per1enoe,

so largely infected

by the relativity of appearance, swings between the 1nfrav1tal beyond of materialism
and the
.
. supra-personal Beyond,

of Immaterialism.
outside the·
'

r~~lm
'
·.
.

···'

Both, as beyond, are atriotly speaking,

or

appearanoee in the body

or

our pyt'amid •••

.

There should be no disjunctive anttthes1a between the timeful
and the timeless.

They are not to be regarded es inoompat!ble

oontradiotories ~· D1f"f1oult as- the task may be they must in

2
some way, be combined in a higher symthesis" •· "God is All

in a11

but in diverse modes and degrees of manifestation."

~

:clad is an object for oonteniplat1on in the same sense as is

4'1

a personal self in social regard.
objective 18 a concept of
and God or Deity

It is God that we contemplate

has whet we are seeking.

~hat

to this; 1t seems.

aoa.·

In other words, what is
It boils down

Morgants God is the Nisus plus .Act1v1ty

plus Efficiency plus Spirit plus Divine Purpose plus God as
a~

eternally existing goal of the evolutionary process.

Alexander.fa Deity is that highest emergent quality toward
'

'l

.

i

which all'things are striving, which has neven been attained •
.Then we may conclude that Morgan hi less panthe1stio than
Alexander who includes God within the prooess

alto~ether.

But, in contrast with Alexander's ?H.sus, we know Morp;an
assumes a personal, purposive, spiritual Being.
Though both men accept the concept of emerp,enoe, there
1s a distinct difference between their 1nterpretat1oris.
Alexander views the

emer~ent

lower level

"trom". a
·"quality".

o:f

as something th!lt evolves

existence•

He calls his emergent

Things· are emerged "from" things.
II

Morgan

II

accepts the idea of from to a oerta in extent but for. his

particular interpretation, the emergent
the thing from wb1oh it emerges.

instead

or ·"quality"

must emerge "with"·

A new type of "relatedness"

is what Morgan olaims to be emergent.

tf.ttaohee·the idea
The concepts are in a way similar
. but Uorgan
(

, of "with" to Alexander•s ":from".

Again, there is a.

part1n~

the mark of the .past or memory.

of the ways in the concept of

.

Morgan says, "Note that
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againness is a oharaotel" of certain presentat5.one in full
swlng; that passing- awayness characterisen the fading pre-

sentat1onJ but that cominejnese a+.taohes to a re-presentotion

wb!oh forestalls a like preseTitat!on and therefore impldee
prior experience or normal routine.

They are quite

d1s~

t1not1vely
oharaotere wlthin the emorgent quality
of: con.
.
soiouanees and enter into oompos1t1o'J"'I only when this level
of

evolutions~y

advance ia roached.

But they involve

phyn1olog1cal and phynioo-ohom1cal proaesees on the planes
or life and of matter; and they cannot adequately be interpreted, under emergent evolution, 1f these be not takem into
1

.

Thus, we see that tho post for Morgen is

oons1derat1on."

no more, the future is not yet, and their marlcs are oharao•
ter1st1o of present evcnte.

They

offe~

data tor referenc&

to a "conceptual sobeme of the past end the future no less

e

present in mind."

,

But, on , the other hand, Alexander oon-

aiders that the past is proaent and esnent:tal to· the enjoy-

ment of memory.

fiben we speak of

~emory

we may mean

!

remembering~

mental.
garded.

This is universally

sd~~tted,

I think, to be

remembered is not universally so reThere are aomo who consider the
that 1s
But whnt is

remembered to be

th!n~

non-mental~

Professor Alexender 1a one of

these who supports such e belief,

When this or that is
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remembered, "experience declares the

of the past on its 1'orehe.r•<1,
the future."

to have the mark

me~ory

the expooted, the ma:-k

nn~

1

or

T'nle mark, I take it, is riot put there by us.

It is found there and therefore can be considered as a non'!:lental mark.

In other words, Ale.xander mc!nta!ns tbat we

ca? experienoe !!2!.
tract

or

and~

at the same tima.

He says, "A

brain may be oocup!ed either by a present or a

past enjoyment."

2

Morgan expllo!tly rejeots·this as has

been shown.
The greatest contrast that appears botween rrorr;nn and

Alexander is found in the

~ot'cept

or

For l'orann, every

T"lan.

happening is a manifestation or expression

or

thG

~rent

world-

plan. Morgan states, "As a matter of direct observation and
under such reflective treatment as enables the

to

ob~erver

furnish a descriptive plf:l1n tale, this, that, or the other

set of evonts;.whloh affords subject-matter for speoial
inqui~l'"i
~outino

runs its course on a plan-not infrequently

with recurrent phases.

~-n

a

The subsistent plan or the

routine-•this, that or the other--1s a pla1n•tale Snferenoe
from the several instances wh:!oh are cUreotly o:~served."

3

Thus we notice that Morgan fits the idea o-r-aonoept of plan

into the entire explanation of plain-tale

of

evo1'1t1on.

Everything runs its oourse-1n a plan and there exiats a
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world-plan or Spirit.
or Spirit in Alexander.

We search vainly for a grant plan
T:-:1np.:a happen due to the"r in1'H.v!dual

natures and are !n n sense 1!''3ependent"

There 1.a no Divine

Purpose or fulfilment of a pattern.
Tb.us we see that Mor,,.an d :tffers frcm Alexander 1:n re-

gard to sense-aata* memory,
plan.

emer~enoe,

These differences do not

~ivoroe

God,

an~

t.he world-

the two syatems

altogether but 1nd1oate that there 1s a definite "parting of

the waya" oonoerning certain ooncepta betweon 'Morgan and
Alenrtder.
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CHAPTER VI.
PROBLEMS

l. Reoono111ation

or

Novelty

In emergent evolution, "eaah

asoend1n~_sta"-e

attribute is .evolved with that of the other."

l

ln the one

Each emergent

is supposedly new, yet is has evolved in some way w!th the
thing to whioh 1b is supervenient.

For the sake ot clearness,

we shall use a simple compound for 1llustrnt1on, that of

..
'

water. The view of emergent evolution seems to 1nd1oate that
'
with the union of hydrogen and oxygen, water emerges as a new
type of relatedness with new relations but still with the
from

wh1oh it emerged.

th1n~s

Water is the emergent and the oharao-

terist!os and union represent the.high degree of aomp1ex1ty
trom which water sprang.
this question.

Now, the d1ff1oulty 1s found in

Is' water someth1'lg 1ntr1ns1cly new or is 1 t

. a mere combination

or

two physical existences that take on

1. P• 116 Emergent Evolution by c. L. Morgan
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a different set-up?

Or, does water contain hydrogen and

oxygen or did these two things by union produce something
radically
ne~
Thia seemingly ambiguous idea in Morgante
"
,,
philosophy, I believe 1e one that foroes itself into view.
Any possible alternati.ve would contradict the system in

general •

h~noe

the ambiguity.

Let us first assume that

emergence entailed the idea that each emerQ'.ent evolved
from the lowe?' thing.

This would

brin~

d1ffioul ty .to Mo?'gan.

Alexander uses emergence in thts sense,

"The

or

emer~enoe

a

new quality from any level of ex1.atenoe means that at that

level there comes into being n oerts!n constellation or
collooat1on of the motions

belong~ng

possessing the quality appropriate to

to the level, end
~.t,

and this collo-

cation possesses a new quality d1st!nct1ve of the h!~her
1
complex.''
This 1s the general connotation of the word
emergent evolution.

However, Lloyd Morgan attempts to

inject a close affiliation or a deeper sense of relatedness
between the emergent and that from which it is

emer~ed.

The

idea of descendence or complete "fro'!l'lnese" is disastrous to
his scheme.

Morgan illustrates his claim of "withness". "A

simple and familiar illustration must suffice.

When oarbon

having certain properties ?ombines w!th sulphur

havin~

other

properties there 1s formed, not a mere mixture ·but a new

1. p. 45 Space, Time and
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or

compound, some

the properties ·of wh1oh are quite d.1.fferent

.

from those of either component.

'Now the weight of the oom-

pound is an additive resultant, the sum of the weip;ht of the

components; and this could be

p~ediote~

of carbon-b1su:lph1r'!.e had been former!•

advance that ff

CR!"bOl"'

f!

before any

~olecule

One ooulc1 any tn

nd sulphur shall bo folmft to combine

ln any iU!loertainablo proportions, there will be 31,oh end

such weight es

Eut sundry other properties are

reoulta~t.

oonst1tut1ve emergents which {1t 1e claimed) could.not be
.foretold in ndvanoe

or

_or ,,op\lrse·, when
• >';· :
icutar instance

may

~'

any 1nstanoe of -suoh oomb1.'!1at1on.

one has learnt what emerges !.n this pa.rt.-

I

one

p?'ed1ot what v1111 emerge in. that

like instance under similar

o!rc~1r.:a.tanoes.

One has learnt

something of the nature. l plan of ornerger.t evolution.~

1

We

understand that the prooeas not only· 1nvolvee 1nvolut1on
between the -lower stages and the higher, but that enoh
particular emergent pyramid is pervaded by both a "with"
&l'ld "from" -nature.

·!.~organ

ropeatenly emphasizes the fact

that the lower level 1s not left

the.t it evolves

"w~th".

o~Jt

in t.h.e r.l"oeeas, but

Thus, we see the t we oan'r'ot asorlbe

merely a·senae of fromnp,ss to his achene.
we are not able to interpret

emer~ent

On the other hand,

evol,1t1.on purely on

·terms of withnese because or his 1ns1stence of novelty.
"But if nothing new emerge - !f there be only re_g?"oup1ng

P• 6§ Emergent Evolution bY
2. P• 64 Emergent Evolution by

1.

c. t.
c. L.

Morgan

Morgan
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no

ot pre-existing events and nothing more - then there 18
1·

emergent evolution.".
a type

or

newness.

There must be an emergence of novelty..

The real emergent is a

~

or

type

re•

latedness.
The issue may also be stated in terms or quality and

relations •. Does Morgan mean that from the l:ower level·or
relatio~s

·a new quality arises?

No - thls is rather the

definite clear-out idea we derive from

In fact,

Alexn~der..

Alexander olaim8 that the .emergent '-s simply a quallty that
emerges from the lower level. · Does Morgan mean that. from an

old relation a new emergent relation or
This is his view•

But, he

~ns1sts

arises?

relate~nes"

that this !s concrete

and .not abstract, to aceount for material substance,
want to make quite clear
use this word.

I shall always

w~at

m~an

"I

when I

It hae rather an abstraot look, but what I

call an instance of relatedness is through and through oon-

orete.

It inoludes not only

the terms•1n-relat1on.

..

ness; so, too 1 is

t~e r~lstion-of-.terms

but also

An ntom is an instance· of related-

an organisms· and

a person.
2

as such, is an instance of re la tednese,"

Any entity,

Here we review

Morgan's attempt to attach ooncreteness or physicalness to
the new emergent.

But he claims a relation in t.he actual

emergent. ·"If it be asked:

What

c.

1. P• 2 '§iergenE Evolution by
2. P• 69 Emergent .Evoli.1tion bv

c.

is 1t that you claim to

t. Morgan

L. Morgan
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be emergent? .. the brief reply is: Some new kind of relation."
Now,. if .the new emergent oolJld be seen
be concrete,· a problem arises.
relations and

nothin~

else?

es

a relation and yet

Can qualities be reduced to

It seems that !!organ would. have

to say that not only does a new relation ar1sel but an aeoomp· any1ng
red.

quality ..

For instance, in the emiasgenoe of the color

If anything cones near being a quality 1t is this, and

apparently red is not a tnere relation and nothing more •
Th~re se~m

to exist emergent •gualities

Morgan would need t9

emergent is evolved

that qua11t1es plus new relations

asAu~e

compose the new emergent.

!l!h

and if this be true,

If we
and

co~sider

~ ~

that this new

the lower level, we

arrive st the mentioned difficulty of novelty.

Does Lloyd

Morgan add to the concept of emern:ent evolution or :1oes he

needlessly complicate it?

I believe he confuses it here

beacuse of the simultane01.Js use
ideas•• namely, "fromness" and
a reoonc111nt1on of novelty

o~ oppos!.11~

"w'. th~eas".

w~th1n

or -1noompat1ble
There should be

the l!m:tts of !Jorgan's

philosophy but it seems that this problem rAmn!ns unsolved.

!. 'P• 69 tniergent Evolution by

c.

t.

Morgan

2. p. 64 Emergent Evolution by c. L. Morgen
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2.

Minor Problems
a.

Spatial-Tempor•al Re la todness

In the beginning of this eneay, this quaat1on wos
alluded to 1n brief.

The inquiry was

possibility of the existence

.

physical things.

or

oonoern~ng

the

apace and time apart from

But, since IJloyd M·organ uses the concept,

space-time, it would be best to atote the problen in this
manner.

Is spatio-temporal relatanness capable of existence

apart f'rom physical events?
.It may be asserted that this problem does not apply
directly to Lloyd Morgan.

Alexander's

philosophy~

.

It :!a :f'undaMeritally an aspect

or

but Morgan aooepta :tt and uses 1t,

under "acknowledgment", so my oontent1on 1s that the assumption is

needed in bis scheme, therefore 1t 1s. permissible to

question it here.
considered

as

It eeemo that t!me ia not something to be

pre-existent because it is merely an attribute

or charaoteriatio of capacities of a physical nature.
'

.

view hero is not, aowever, that motion preceded time.

My
The

point is that motion which involves time is something appl!oable only to something phystoal.

It is incomprehensible to

f!Onedder the physical movement of abstractions.

If we agree

,.

.

that motion necessarily involves physical
existences, we can
.
then ask if motion presupposes tl:me.
in the affirmative.

The answer, I think is

T!me, as we commonly speak of it, is
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either the period during which an aot1on or process continues
or that which purports to be measurable.

If no action or

poroess occurs or thero is nothl1'1f'.. to be mesaured 1n a durat-

so,

ional aense• then there is no time.

because of this feet

we conclude that t1me presupposes or lr.ipl1es the physloal 1 so
we say time prea\lpposee phys!oel ax1stenoea ~T'lcf cannot poss•

ibly exist' without ,'them.

Space ic th~t ?1h1 ch 1~ oharaoterized

by e·xtens1on in all df:ro~t~ons, 'boundlessness, and 1.ndefinit:e

d1v1s 1b111 ty; the sub jeot of
direction.

ti e+.ermlnat:tons

It is cHffiOlllt to

~.magl'l"e

of' pos '·t fon and

e wo,.ld of spaoe and

it also is diffioult to imagine no apace.

However, from an

observational point or view, wo are able to see that the only
tGl'mS

that we onn know space are those involved in pbys1oal

existence•
sense

1)f

·rn

the mental world, there exists no space 1n the

extension.

space occupies apace.

To me, 1 t ls nonsense to ndvoca te that
Space seems to be rather a relation

or a capacity of physical objects.

If so, then we may apply

'
our argument
again end contend that space presupposes physical

objects.

However,

~.t

must be aokrtowledged that tho actual basis

Alexander and Morr:an use :!s not space

t:tme.

!.!!9.

t-tme but spaoe-

This 1s offered as s supplement to the three spatial

dimensions and is .knor1n as the space-time cont!rmum.

Their

nlto~ether

from a

assertion is that this basis is not apart
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physical nature because the

es~ent1al

nature

or

space-time

is that it is the notua:t stuff of which all real1. ty ls com-

posed.

.

"In truth, 1nf1T"1te Spacei.;.T1me 1a not the substance

of substances• but it is the stuff of substances.

No word is
C'

more appt'opr1ate to it than the ancient one of hyle(U~)\

).

Just as a roll of cloth is the stuff of wh1oh eoats are made,

but it is not itself a coat, so Spece-Time is the stuff of
which all things, v;hether as aubstsnces or under any category; are made.

If I oall it the stuff nnd not the mnter1al,

1t is to avoid confusion wtth the very much more speoif"io
. 1
idea of msttet-, as matter is commonly understood. rr.. Yet we
realize that thi?n;;a may endure w1thout. occupying space.
example, I reMember my barefoot days.
but 1 t requires no spa oe.

Th1e is an existent

The oonte!lt ion of these Men. 1e

that the two (space and time) nre lriseparable.
ma~ner

there is no mere spr.ce or

Time and Time-Space."

2

For

~ere

"In

1~.ke

time but only Spaeo-

Although this contention is me.de, I

believe we hevo a good case for their separate existent 1n
the realm of abstraction and memory.

may be ascribed to those things

wh~ch

It seems that duration

are recalled er used

by the mind but they do not occupy space.

They could not be

oharacterized by space-time because they nre not mace of
'"physical"

1. p.
2. P•

sturr

and space-time pU'l"ports to be composed of

341 Space, Tlme nnd

De~ty

48 Spaoe, Time and De1ty

by s.
by

R.

Alexander
Ale~nnder
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"physical" attributes.
s~ems

be

to

spnoe •

The contention here is that there

n reality of time

~e A th1n~

Memory shows us tfl.s t vre
oe~ureCI

which hn'1e

'ndapendent of

attach t:tme ·to e'rtrnta

"!10y

a '!"ld do rot· 1n,Tol,re spnoe for the •,r ex-

ls tenc&. ·.The fnot 'of historloal evente ts an 1Jluatrat1on''

of thts

to

po!~t'

We can use the

nn~cepts

"before" and "after"

characterize past Avants e,...d ft t them irrto a

chronoloe;1cal acherie.

. or abstract

reaaon~nr:

Ap;a1n, in the case o.t' or1thriet1 cal

we are able to

n~r,crtatn

'
as'pects
though space ia· '.rnnecesanry.

problem 1s reta lned

wh1.l~

throughout.

durnt"o:nal

A premise :tn a logical

the coT1olns 1on 1 s beh'lg reached

and things may precede or follo'!i one another
reaaon.tn~

,.:f pf:frd. te

1.n

ob:Jtrect

If th!.s 1s posr,1ble end absolute or

pure.: time 1a ad-nltted; than there

eY..~sts

a _prc1)1ern at this

point in emergent evolution.

b.

Life and Mind
~~1<"e,seems

to bee vaguen<:as concerning the beg1T'lntnP'.S

of,')J.f&''S.rid mlnd nnd their d~st:tnot1on from each oth~r in

Morgante evolut!.on~,. Tha:re are :-isl'ly ~:nrUcnt1ons that '~organ

reverts to the 'httr1butes" of Spinoza.

ITe

see~s

to subs-

titute matter for "extene!or1" and mind for Sptnoza' s ~thou~ht".
1l1nd ls to be

foun~ rlown

at the lower levels of" existence and

is an attribute of nature.

integral entities we call

";v1th!n the wbole domn!n
organfs~

or

those

there 1s oonoom1tance of
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ot mental events with bioses - that 14 physical and physiological events."

1

We see that the mental exists in the

life level and also on the level of nature.

"For me, in

the good company of Spinoza end his followera, m1nd ls with-

in one of the two "attributes" or nature.

It is the natural

correlate of oertain physical events which belong to the
2

other attribute."

the~e

"Throughout the story of reference

is an accompaniment of bodily action; throughout the story
of !ntluenee there is an acaompaniment ot reference and
enjoy~ent•

But both ere Included in one synthesis: and

underlying both -- common to both •• is substantial unity,
one and indivisible.

In the distinction I draw between

two stories I do but echo Spinoza.

For me, as for him,

•substance thinking and substance extended are one and the
same substance, comprehended now
now through the other."

3

throu~h

one attribute

&Tid

We see here than Morgan adopts

Spinoza's oonoept or "thought aTid extension" at least 1n
its essential function.

He not only speaks of mind in th1a

sense but it is also treated as an emergent.

"Under what

I here oall emergent evolution stresa is laid on the incoming of the new.

Salient examples are offered in the

l. P• 11 Li~e, Mind and Spirit by c. L. Morgen
2. P• 27 Emergent Evolution by c. L. Morgan
3. P• 249 Life, Mind and Spirit by c. L. Morgan
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advent of life, 1n the advent of mind, and !n the advent of
1

r~fleotive thou~ht."

Tho problem thnt Prises coneorns the

double aspect or role of m1nd.

How can it be used in an

innate or developing sense and also as an ·.emergent?
emerr,ent is by definition so1'?1cthing new and

un~.que

A:n

and if

mind persists along ?:1th oxtcnaion or matte?' from the

base of our· pyramtd, there !a no chance for it to ba an

emergent.

Thus, the

m~n<i

tusion instead of clarity.

conc~pt

1.r. Horgan brin.".a con-

Again,, when we attempt to

classify life in Morgan's theory, we havo difficulty,
and mind alike belong to a different orr'ior of'

bein~

nL1fe

\"1hioh

cannot arise out of .. enn only net into - the m~terial order
2
of being."
Apparently, Uorgnn addn life to this othor 1doa

of thou"'.ht and extension because
way e.e mind in th1e ser..se.
life and

m~na

are

- that this

is

true.

!t

is t'l"'eetcd hi the

Could Horr,an Mean that

everlaatln~ e:x~stents?

mA

en~e

tter,

He see"Ms to hold

However, he regards the same three

levels of existenoe as h1.s chief emerc.;ents and cons 1ders
them as being supervenient on the other (mind on life end
matte:r).

The problem ~Y be summarized 15r1etly:

ThinBe oan

not be used as immanent, everlasting as in Spinoza's sense;
and still be nn"emergent" 1n emergent evolution.

Morga~

seems.particularly vague concerning the concept of life•

l. P• 1 Emerger?tEvolution by c. L. Morgan
2. P• 136 Emergent Evolution by c. L. Morgan
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Be asks us not to question the g'p between it end the thing
from which it emerged and

~ives

examples of the close

resemblance between the hir..her form or the inorganic, and the
lower

f~om

of life ( radium and one oell organisms), and yet

assertn that it does not emerRe from the "material order of
being"-

This confusion is closely related to the probem

we mentioned aoncetoning novelty.
posti.Jtl.ate

unique

emer~ents bu~

everlastingess and development.

It s eema Uorgan needs to

also needs to retain.

-··
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3•

God.
By

Morgante oonoept of Spirit, we see that the pyramid

ot evolution is in aocordanoe with Divine Purpose or a
great plan.

Different developments in evolution are groan-

.

ing or yearning for greater attainment •. In this seneo,

God is the Nisus towards deity.

De!ty

belcn~e

to the order

ot perfection. As the universe flowering to deity, Gori has
no r1val 1 just as on t!'le level of mt.,..dt there exists no un•
mind.

Deity in the universe as a whole 1e like life in

healthy body.

God 1e the power wh1oh

~akee

for deity.

1s the Nisua causing the· emerrr;enta to go upward•

evolution is really

~ot suf~io!ent.

perfect Energizer, a god who
process but not space-tl,..,e,

H& is the

~.s

cause and Causality.

goal and apex of the pyraM1d.

He

:<:r.ier~ont

God is the eternal

transcends
Ile

~

evolution

t~e

the direotivo .Activity.

Re ts the Eff1enoy and the
Thie

co~plex conc~pt1on

of

God has definite elements of the Ideeltst1o philosophers.
Fichte,

Sche:Itlermncher and Regel all ar,ree that

Schellin~,

the goal of the Absolute•e striving or the imr.ianent purpose
ie self-expression, se1.f'-r.eal1zat1.on Eind relf-devclop::nent.

The Absolute is the
a manifestation.

1nf~.rd

tc aot;1v1 ty of

wh~ch

all else is

However, the Abaolnte Idee.11.ots

confine everyth1.nr, to

spncr.:-t~me

as does ':!organ.

mav
. be olass1f1ed es a Absolut:' 6{;j. bnt '"~e is

'YIOt

ao not
~~orr,n-n

en
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Idealist.

However, the problems that confront Morgan are

similar to those that confront the Absolute Ideal1at.

The

real problem for !!organ with his God co.,cept is to present

a reasonable synthesis between the traditional God ann the
God or drive of the evolutionist.

He wants to retain the

idea that God is eternal nnd that the goal of the striving
found 1n the evoJlktionat-y prooeaa is God but he also

attempts to use God as the N1sus and in a sense everlasting
or within the process.

It does not seem plausible to oon-

oieve God as a goal and yet be used in the world-pleb in an

immanent capacity.

My contention here is that it 1s

d1ff1oult to synthesize the two somewhat opposing oonoepts
-

,

>

"

or God e.n·d that, for the sake of clarity and plausibility,
Morgan should make a choice to
evolution.

~nolude

:t.n his emergent
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CRAPTTm VII
COUCLlJS IONS

Emergent evolution is on attempt to account for whnt

is before us.

It, in a sense, pronll'?ts tho rutnre, re-

trospects the past nnd explains the

~~oaont.

It offers

the beat explanation that we can f1rid from an e'11olut1oner:v

viewpoint because it gives the mont comprehens1ve 1.""ter•
pretation of the universe.
The

interprotatio~s

of

Alexa~der

and

~organ

sre su-

perior to those of Smuts and :=-.elll\rs I thhik, beoauae of
their inclusion of God and the N1suo within their roepec-

tlve systems.

Alexander,

I feel

~a

the most brilliant

of all, for he offers the most plausible soheme.
reality, the liasis for

~.!organ's

theory.

He is in

However, Morgan

does present a unique, individual scheme that reflects
philosophical ganlua and hia theory le a contribution to
metephysies •

But, Morge.l·, ra1st:.S d'!.ff1ou1!'1.en in

~is

system

that Alexander.does not have to cope w1th, namely, the
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recono1lint1on of evet-lastinr;
,

ex~.ctents

and the "ft-om ntid

w1th0 idet\ of o~rgenoe, and confl1ctlns attributes of God.
A'l.exrinde1~

nssorta that the omergonta are e-morr:;ed or

q,ual1 tied "from"the '1ower levela r:nd not "v11 th" and God

plnys a single comprehensive 2:-ole !t
More than the others, . :lforgun loans toward a personal

or somewhn t

"orthodox~'

God.· Ue

~;1ves

us nn s.ttenpted

synthesis bet':Teen evolution nnd God nmi prosente the teat

theological theory.

In this sphere, I believe, Lloyd

lfO?:'gan ne.kes a positive addition to emol"r.rent e,rolution.
Biology ini.tie.tcd the

eohe~J Al.e~ander

supplied a oor:t ..

»'l"thene1ve ground-plan; tho nov-01 concepts of, emerqonoe

and God gave it the proper dlat:lnotion; thus, Lloyd
Morgan ts interpretation of

emorF~ent

evolution gave

1~zr

metaphysical contribution to the field or ph:tlosoph7.

THE ElID
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